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Introduction 
 
The first of the seven priority recommendations to be found in Baroness Tanni Grey-
Thompson’s Duty of Care Review of UK Sport (2017) proposed the establishment of 
a Sports Ombudsman. The suggestion for such an office had been made by the 
authors at the consultation phase of the Review. This article sketches out how, in 
ensuring that national sports governing bodies discharge their duty of care, this 
Ombudsman might work, the scope of its jurisdiction and the enforcement of its 
recommendations. Various models are suggested with the emphasis on an 
accessible, athlete-centred and fully accountable approach to dispute resolution in 
UK sport. Of particular interest will be the suggested “maladministration” model, 
which, if ever acted upon, would give a Sports Ombudsman extensive powers of 
oversight and redress over UK sport and which might, if successful, provide the 
model for an independent, athlete-accountable, international sports ombudsman’s 
office.  
 
Duty of Care Review 
 
In December 2015, as part of the UK government’s Sporting Future strategy,1 the 
Minister for Sport asked Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson to conduct an independent 
review into the “Duty of Care” sport has towards its participants. In the consultation 
phase, Tanni Grey-Thompson and her review panel righty took a “deliberately 
broad definition of ‘Duty of Care’ – covering everything from personal safety and 
injury, to mental health issues, to the support given to people at the elite level.”2  
The Duty of Care in Sport Report (DoC in Sport Report) was given to and published 
by the Department of Digital, Media, Culture and Sport (DMCS) in April 2017.3 
 
The DoC in Sport Report made seven “Priority Recommendations”, the first of 
which was the creation of a Sports Ombudsman: 
 
“The government should create a Sports Ombudsman (or Sports Duty of Care 
Quality Commission). This organisation should have powers to hold national 
governing bodies (NGBs) to account for the Duty of Care they provide to all athletes, 
																																								 																				
* An earlier, abridged version of this article appeared as J. Anderson and N. Partington, “Duty of Care 
in Sport: Time for a Sports Ombudsman?” Lawinsport.com, 26 September 2017. 
1 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sporting-future-a-new-strategy-for-an-active-
nation [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
2 For the exact terms of reference and the group’s membership see Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson, 
Duty of Care in Sport: Independent Report to Government (Department for Digital, Culture, Media & 
Sport, London, 2017) Annex A and 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/610130/Duty_o
f_Care_Review_-_April_2017__2.pdf [Accessed 31 August 2017]. 
3 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/duty-of-care-in-sport-review [Accessed 1 
October 2017].	
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coaching staff and support staff, providing independent assurance and 
accountability to address many of the issues covered by this review.”4 
 
The priority given to an Ombudsman was related to a key recommendation of the 
DoC in Sport Report: that national governing bodies (NGBs) should have, as a 
mandatory condition of future funding, a nominated, Board-level guardian 
responsible for issues relating to Duty of Care in sport.5 Accordingly, the DoC in 
Sport Report recommended that in order to hold NGBs to account in this regard: 
 
“…consideration should be given to creating a Sports Ombudsman (or Duty of Care 
Quality Commission) to provide third party assurance. This should be separate from 
UK Sport (the organisation that allocates both elite funding and medal targets to 
NGBs) to ensure operational independence in upholding Duty of Care principles to 
all participants and to maintain public confidence that sport is conducted ethically.”6 
 
In a submission during the consultation phase, the authors had suggested the 
creation of a Sports Ombudsman as “an effective, anonymous, independent and less 
adversarial means of reviewing and processing complaints about, or integrity issues 
in, sport and…build up a level of investigatory history…usefully applied to all 
sports to prevent disputes.”7 This brief paper elaborates on that submission and 
considers four models that might best support the objectives of the DoC in Sport 
Report. The models, which are based on adaptations of existing schemes, could be 
implemented discretely or, more attractively, by way of a blended approach 
encompassing elements of all four in an overarching UK Sports Ombudsman office.  
 
Ombudsmen Elsewhere 
 
The idea of a sector specific Ombudsman or complaint handling body is not a novel 
one. In the UK alone, the Ombudsman Association lists over 40 such entities ranging 
from the Financial Ombudsman to the Furniture Ombudsman.8  Since 2008, a sports 
specific Ombudsman has existed for football in the guise of the Independent Football 
Ombudsman.9  Moreover, a dedicated Sports Ombudsman has been mooted for over 
																																								 																				
4 DoC in Sport Report, p. 6. 
5 See priority no. 3 at DoC in Sport Report, p. 6: “All NGB boards should have a named Duty of Care 
Guardian. The Guardian should have an explicit responsibility and leadership role to engage with 
participants across the talent pathways and in community sport, and to provide assurance at board 
level.” 
6 DoC in Sport Report, p. 15. 
7 J. Anderson and N. Partington, “The Scope of the Duty of Care in Sport – A Submission in Relation 
to the UK Government’s Review” Lawinsport.com, 10 June 2016, 
https://www.lawinsport.com/blog/jack-anderson/item/the-scope-of-the-duty-of-care-in-sport-a-
submission-in-relation-to-uk-government-s-review [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
8 See http://www.ombudsmanassociation.org [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
9 See generally M. Delahanty, “A Guide to England’s Independent Football Ombudsman” 
Lawinsport.com, 15 April 2015, https://www.lawinsport.com/blog/littleton-chambers/item/a-
guide-to-england-s-independent-football-ombudsman [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
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a decade and principally by the former Director of Ethics and Anti-Doping at UK 
Sport, Michelle Verroken.10 
 
The establishment of a national Sports Ombudsman has been discussed in other 
jurisdictions, most notably India11 where the focus has, unsurprisingly, been on 
cricket-related disputes.12 In Australia, as part of the development of federal 
government’s current National Sport Plan,13 a consultation process is ongoing as to 
the establishment of a national sports integrity commission in which an 
Ombudsman’s office may have a role.14  Equally, that Australian process may lead to 
the foundation of a dedicated national sports integrity tribunal and possibly even on 
the statutory model found in New Zealand – the Sports Tribunal of New Zealand.15	
More likely, the model that will emerge in Australia will be similar to that found in 
Canada - the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada (SDRCC).16  
 
Of specific note here is that in March 2017, SDRCC produced a comprehensive 
research proposal on the possible creation of a Sports Ombudsman for Canada. That 
report, called “Closing the Loop”,17 is of immediate interest for two reasons. 
 
First, after a comprehensive consultation process, the “Closing the Loop” report 
focused on four issues: (a) mapping the existing complaints and dispute resolution 
capacities of the various sports entities in Canada and asking about their future 
needs in this regard; (b) developing recommendations about the jurisdiction and 
scope of authority of any eventual Ombudsman’s office; (c) the (internal) structure or 
governance of such an Ombudsman and how it might itself be externally 
accountable; and (d) funding models and how any such model might impact on the 
Ombudsman’s independence. This methodology, and particularly on funding, 
provides an obvious template for any future research on the possible establishment 
of a Sports Ombudsman for the UK. 
 
																																								 																				
10 See, for example, House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Human Enhancement 
Technologies in Sport: Second Report of Session 2006–07 (The Stationary Office Ltd, London, 2007) at Ev 
87, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmsctech/67/67.pdf [Accessed 1 
October 2017]. 
11 N. Karmath, “Indian Sports Federations Need to Restructure to Meet International Standards” 
Lawinsport.com, 29 June 2017, https://www.lawinsport.com/features/item/indian-sports-
federations-need-to-restructure-to-meet-international-standards [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
12 R. Seshank and S. Anirban, “The Impact of the Lodha Committee: BCCI Report on Sports 
Governance in India” Lawinsport.com, 15 December 2016, 
https://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/the-impact-of-the-lodha-committee-bcci-report-on-
sports-governance-in-india [Accessed 1 October 2017].  
13 https://www.ausport.gov.au/nationalsportplan [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
14 See 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/ministers/publishing.nsf/Content/54BBB239BD1EA71FCA258
17400837B01/$File/GH076.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
15 http://www.sportstribunal.org.nz [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
16 http://www.crdsc-sdrcc.ca/eng/home [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
17 http://www.crdsc-sdrcc.ca/eng/documents/Closing%20the%20Loop%20-
%20A%20Proposal%20for%20a%20Sport%20Ombuds%20in%20Canada%20EN%20final.pdf 
[Accessed 1 October 2017].	
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The second matter of interest emanating from the “Closing the Loop” report is that, 
although the report rightly prioritised an accessible, nimble and responsive service, 
it also emphasised that an Ombudsman service must “complement, not duplicate” 
those services already available to Canadian sport and particularly in the area of 
formal grievance, dispute resolution or appeals procedures.18 The procedures 
referred to may be those internally provided by a NGB or from an external source.  
In this, the immediate concern with duplication was with the extant services of the 
SDRCC itself. Under its establishing legislation - Provision 10 of the Act to Promote 
Physical Activity and Sport (S.C. 2003, c.2)19 – the SDRCC’s mission is to provide the 
Canadian sports community with not only a national sports-specific dispute 
resolution service but also, in a preventative way, to educate and capacity build in 
the area of dispute resolution.  
 
How a Canadian Sports Ombudsman might complement the SDRCC’s current 
mandate was of critical concern to the “Closing the Loop” report – the solution 
ultimately proposed was for the Sport Ombudsman to operate as a sub-unit within 
the current organisational structure of SDRCC. This is of interest in a UK setting 
because a body similar to the SDRCC exists in the UK – Sports Resolutions.20  How 
an Ombudsman might complement Sports Resolution’s services, whether an 
Ombudsman might offer competing services or whether the role and functions of 
such an office could simply be provided through a widening of Sports Resolutions’ 
current ambit are key issues that will be returned to shortly and need to be debated 
further.   
 
How might a UK Sports Ombudsman Work  
 
This brief paper considers four models that might be considered both separately but 
also, and more attractively, by way of a blended approach encompassing all four.  
 
Advocacy and Advice: the USOC Approach 
 
The first model is an adaptation of the United States Olympic Committee’s Athlete 
Ombudsman.21 The USOC Athlete Ombudsman’s core function, mandated by 
federal law, is very much athlete-centred advocating and providing cost-free, 
confidential and independent advice	for athletes (in the broad generic and American 
use of that term) on a range of matters and including challenges to team selection; 
anti-doping violations; the interpretation of commercial agreements; and even 
citizenship and other eligibility concerns.22 If possible the USOC Athlete 
Ombudsman attempts to resolve disputes informally but, crucially, in doing so 
																																								 																				
18 Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada, “Closing the Loop: Proposal for a Sports Ombuds for 
Canada”, Final Report, 31 March 2017, p. 2.  
19 https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2003-c-2/latest/sc-2003-c-2.html [Accessed 1 October 
2017]. 
20 https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
21 http://www.teamusa.org/Athlete-Resources/Athlete-Ombudsman [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
22 Originally, the Amateur Sports Act 1978 (now The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act – 
revised in 1998 and including the establishment of an Ombudsman). This federal provision appoints 
the USOC as the coordinating body for all Olympic-related athletic activity in the United States. 
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ensures that there is an “equality of arms” in the representative power of the athlete 
in their dispute with a NGB or other party such as a coach, administrator or sponsor. 
 
By advocating for athletes in this regard, the USOC Ombudsman exercises a 
considerable amount of “soft” power. On the one hand, athlete-advocates appointed 
by the Ombudsman ensure that sports bodies comply with their codes of conduct, 
governance and legal responsibilities and, on the other hand, such advocacy may, by 
clarifying NGBs’ responsibilities to athletes, reduce the future need for the escalation 
of disputes to the benefit of athletes’ and administrators’ time and, financial and 
emotional well-being. Moreover, and to the mutual benefit of both sides, confidence 
in existing grievance and dispute resolution mechanisms across sport is reinforced. 
 
There is much to recommend the USOC model; nevertheless, and as implied in	the 
DoC in Sport Report, this enhanced “advocacy and advisory” role could be effected 
by widening the remit of, and diverting more resources to, the British Athletes 
Commission (BAC).23 The BAC24 was established in 2004 as an independent 
membership association to represent the interests of athletes in elite performance 
sports in Great Britain. It has three core objectives – impartial and confidential 
advice, athlete representation and athlete advocacy - largely mirroring those of the 
USOC Ombudsman.  
 
Writing about the recent creation of a dedicated athletes commission for the sport of 
athletics in Britain, Richard Yates (a former athlete now solicitor and member of the 
inaugural Commission) rightly made the point that without proper resourcing and 
without careful, calibrated integration within extant dispute resolution structures, 
athlete commissions of this nature (and ergo an Ombudsman) are susceptible to 
becoming no more than a “complaints box” for athletes.25  
 
If a UK Sports Ombudsman is to avoid become another “cobwebbed” complaints 
box, it must, as suggested, be given a strong voice to advocate for athletes; it must 
have the resources to make some noise; and NGBs must be obliged, in discharging 
their duty of care commitments, to listen to what is said.   
 
An Enhanced Independent (Football) Ombudsman  
  
A second possible model is an adaptation of the (aforementioned) Independent 
Football Ombudsman (IFO) in English football.  
 
At first glance the IFO’s role is authoritative and meaningful – it is the final step in 
the complaints resolution hierarchy operating in English football. The IFO can 
																																								 																				
23 See priority no. 7 at DoC in Sport Report, p. 6: “Government should independently fund the BAC to 
enable it to provide the best support to participants on talent pathways in Olympic and Paralympic 
sports. This will increase confidence in grievance and dispute resolution, reducing the need for 
escalation, saving time, money and emotion.” 
24 http://www.britishathletes.org [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
25 R. Yates, “UK Athletics Creates Long Overdue Athletes’ Commission” Lawinsport.com, 11 July 
2017, https://www.lawinsport.com/features/item/uk-athletics-creates-long-overdue-athletes-
commission [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
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initiate an adjudication process as to whether in handling a complaint relating to its 
membership or ticketing policies, spectator accessibility or merchandising, the club 
or authority in question did so in compliance with its own Code of Conduct or 
Customer Charter.26  
 
At the time of writing, the most recent adjudication on the IFO’s website involved a 
complaint by a Hull City supporter that a number of benefits promised by the club 
on purchasing memberships for the 2016/17 season had not materialised. 
Accordingly, the complainant contended – the Advertising Standards Agency also 
being involved - the memberships in question had been mis-sold.27 If a complaint is 
upheld, the IFO has a range of “soft” remedies available to it; for example, 
recommending that an apology be issued and/or a commitment be given that the 
behaviour in question will not be repeated. In the Hull City adjudication, the IFO 
recommended that the club review its customer service arrangements to make them 
more “user friendly”.28  
 
All of this is of relevance to a UK Sports Ombudsman and particularly if the key 
function envisaged for such an office is – as would be forcefully suggested - to 
monitor and ensure that the duty of care commitments and priorities outlined in the	
DoC in Sport Report (encapsulated contractually in the Duty of Care Charter) are 
discharged by the various NGBs both in form and in substance.29  
 
It is suggested that, at the very least, a Sports Ombudsman should be given “soft 
redress” powers. For example, where the Ombudsman upholds a complaint by an 
individual against a NGB, the following recommendations should be available:  an 
apology; the commitment to provide a service the complainant should have had; on 
remittal, that the NGB makes the decision it should have done before; that the NGB 
reconsiders a decision it did not take properly in the first place; that the NGB 
improve its procedures so similar problems do not happen again; possibly some 
limited compensatory remedy relating to any reasonable expenses or costs incurred.  
 
Most importantly however, adjudication by the UK Sports Ombudsman would have 
to be “hard” i.e., where at all possible its recommendations must be binding in 
nature; in contrast to the IFO’s recommendations which, although parties are 
normally expected to implement them, are non-binding.  
 
																																								 																				
26 The IFO is accredited as an Approved Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Body under the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes (Competent Authorities and Information) 
Regulations 2015. A UK Sports Ombudsman should strive to obtain the same level of regulatory 
recognition.  
27 See, for example, IFO Complaint Ref 17/15, Alleged Mis-selling of Memberships at Hull City, 6 
Sept 2017, http://www.theifo.co.uk/adjudications/hull17iiR.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
28 IFO Complaint Ref 17/15 at para. 12.  
29 See priority no. 6 at DoC in Sport Report, p. 6: “A Duty of Care Charter should be established by 
government, explicitly setting out how participants, coaches and support staff can expect to be treated 
and where they can go if they need advice, support and guidance. As part of this, participants who 
receive funding (in any part of the system) should be offered honorary contracts, which set out the 
roles and responsibilities of both the sport and the participant.” 
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Admittedly, under the IFO scheme, where a club considers that it cannot implement 
an IFO recommendation, it must publish the reasoning behind such a decision and 
any proposed alternative resolution to the complaint. As seen however in the 
Premier League’s response to IFO recommendations relating to the re-scheduling of 
an Arsenal FC versus Leicester City FC of 14 February 2016 (and the extent to which 
it financially discommoded travelling supporters),30 such replies often simply couch 
an outright refusal to implement IFO recommendations – in this instance relating to 
a refund scheme for fans - in patronising “corporate-speak”: “The Premier League 
thanks the IFO for their valuable input, and remains fully committed to working 
with clubs to develop positive processes in this area.”31 
 
The Maladministration Model 
 
First, it is suggested that the most radical jurisdiction that might be given to a UK 
Sports Ombudsman, and one unique in a global sporting context, would entail 
powers to investigate cases of alleged “maladministration” by NGBs. Although 
lacking precise definition, maladministration is a term used frequently in various 
Ombudsman schemes and in this instance may equate simply to the administrative 
failings of a sporting body. More specifically, and using those given on the Local 
Government Ombudsman’s (LGO) website,32 examples of maladministration which 
could give rise to a valid complaint include: delay;	 failure to reply; poor record 
keeping; failure to take action or investigate; failure to follow procedures or the law; 
poor communication; refusal of information or the giving out of misleading 
information.		
	
Simply put, maladministration is about poor governance generally and thus, 
radically, the jurisdictional parameters and powers of investigation of a UK Sports 
Ombudsman could be aligned against UK Sport’s recent Code for Sports 
Governance.33 In other words, the Sports Ombudsman could be an effective means 
of ensuring that the principles of good governance demanded by the Code of sports 
organisations in receipt of public funds are implemented both in form and in 
substance.   
 
Although the above would appear a radical step in the oversight it might transfer to 
the Ombudsman with regard to the activities of NGBs and UK Sport more generally; 
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman would be delimited in three ways. These 
																																								 																				
30 http://www.theifo.co.uk/adjudications/IFO_1607.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
31 Premier League Statement on the Independent Football Ombudsman, 10 Jan 2017, 
https://www.premierleague.com/news/294273 [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
32  See http://www.lgo.org.uk/make-a-complaint/what-we-can-and-cannot-look-at [Accessed 1 
October 2017].  The Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman (LGO) was established in the UK 
by the Local Government Act 1974. LGO covers local authorities and other specific public bodies 
within England only. For a thorough overview see M. Sanford, The Local Government Ombudsman 
(House of Commons Library Briefing Paper Number 04117) 17 July 2017.  
33 http://www.uksport.gov.uk/resources/governance-code [Accessed 1 October 2017]. See further E. 
Stephens, “A Guide to the UK’s New Code for Sports Governance” Lawinsport.com, 13 March 2017, 
https://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/a-guide-to-the-uk-s-new-code-for-sport-governance 
[Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
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jurisdictional limitations can be reconciled with those in place in other, effective 
Ombudsman schemes operating in the UK – the LGO example is the one use here.  
 
First, and before a matter could be taken up by the Sports Ombudsman, any 
complainant would have to demonstrate that they tried meaningfully to engage with 
or exhaust the dispute resolution process of the NGB in question and, on 
dissatisfaction with the NGB’s response, have since taken their complaint to the 
Ombudsman within a reasonable period of time.   
 
Second, even if the meaningful engagement/time limit hurdle is overcome, this 
should not mean that a complaint will, as of right, be investigated by an 
Ombudsman. An initial assessment or triage of the complaint could then be 
undertaken to see whether, at the discretion of the Ombudsman, an arguable case of 
maladministration can be identified.  
 
The (fourfold) LGO approach at this “triage” stage again appears to be one that 
might be usefully adapted in the exercise of the Sport Ombudsman’s discretion to 
investigate:34 the “injustice” step, which would assess the level of personal injustice 
or prejudice the complainant claims to have been caused as a direct result of the 
actions or inactions of the NGB; the “fault” test, which would assess the scale, 
gravity and nature of the fault that the complainant alleges has occurred and 
whether it is directly linked to the injustice claimed; the “remedy” test, which would 
assess how likely it is that the Ombudsman would be able to achieve a meaningful 
outcome to the complaint; the “sporting interest” test, which would assess the level 
of wider sporting (public) interest arising from the individual case.35   
 
Third, any concern about the final, binding nature of a UK Sports Ombudsman’s 
recommendations, decisions or wider activities could be offset by providing a 
complainant with a limited judicial review or limited appellate process to an entity 
such as Sports Resolutions.36 The basis of Sport Resolutions’ supervisory jurisdiction, 
or the extent of a complainant’s right of review, would be limited to grounds of error 
of law, unreasonableness, unfairness, irrationality, proportionality, serious 
procedural irregularity etc. 
 
The analogy here is to the ordinary courts’ residual supervisory jurisdiction over the 
Financial Ombudsman (FO), seen to good effect recently in the High Court in Aviva 
Life & Pensions (UK) Ltd, R (On the Application Of) v McCulloch & Anor,37 where the 
High Court quashed a decision of the Financial Ombudsman (FO) on the grounds 
																																								 																				
34 See http://www.lgo.org.uk/information-centre/staff-guidance/assessment-code#injustice 
[Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
35 Evidently, where the Ombudsman is of the view that the nature of the complaint or its surrounding 
circumstances (e.g., an allegations of serious fraud etc) are better dealt with by law enforcement, the 
matter should be referred to the appropriate (criminal justice) authorities. 
36 See https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
37 Aviva Life & Pensions (UK) Ltd, R (On the Application Of) v McCulloch & Anor [2017] EWHC 352.  
Available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2017/352.html [Accessed 1 October 
2017]. 
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that the FO had provided insufficient reasons for departing from the relevant law 
regarding misrepresentation in an insurance contract.  
 
It is hoped that the above three safeguards might give NGBs in the UK sufficient 
assurance to agree to a Sports Ombudsman with a broad “maladministration” 
jurisdiction, which we think would, in the language of the	DoC in Sport Report, be 
the best way to enable it to hold “NGB’s to account for the Duty of Care they 
provide to all athletes, coaching staff and	 support staff, providing independent 
assurance and accountability to address many of the issues covered by this [Duty of 
Care in Sport] review.”38  
 
Investigatory Model 
 
At what might be called the appellate level of sports dispute resolution, UK sport is 
well served by Sports Resolutions. Since its establishment in 1997, it has become the 
dispute resolution referral service of choice for all sports in the UK39 – administering, 
for example, the	UK’s National (Child) Safeguarding Panel (NSP)40 and the National 
Anti-Doping Panel (NADP).41 Moreover, where a sports body lacks the capacity to, 
or may otherwise need (because of the difficult nature of the dispute) assistance in 
case managing, constituting or chairing a tribunal hearing under its internal rules, 
Sports Resolutions can provide external assistance on a contract-specific42 or ad hoc 
basis.  
 
It is suggested that the latter “ad hoc” approach has been key to the growing 
authority of Sports Resolutions in that it has a mutual attraction for the parties in 
dispute: on the one hand, the NGB is assured that, irrespective of outcome, the 
matter is being heard pursuant to its regulations; on the other hand, the aggrieved 
individual or club is assured that, irrespective of outcome, the process is being led by 
an experienced, independent appointee.  
 
With the above in mind, it must be remembered that outside of the better resourced 
sports, and single issue disciplinary cases apart, many NGBs lack the time, capacity 
and skills to initiate and sustain an investigation of any meaningful depth or 
complexity - a match-fixing investigation being a prime example. Even well-
resourced sports, such as football in England, can on occasion be overwhelmed – as 
has been seen by the ongoing Independent Review into Child Sex Abuse Allegations 
in Football.43 Moreover, where an issue demands an investigation that goes beyond 
technical governance matters and into the ethos or culture of a sport, an independent 
																																								 																				
38 DoC in Sport Report, p. 6. 
39 https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/services/referral-clauses [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
40 https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/services/national-safeguarding-panel [Accessed 1 October 
2017]. 
41 https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/services/national-anti-doping-panel [Accessed 1 October 
2017]. 
42 https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/uploads/related-
documents/SR_Standard_Dispute_Resolution_Clauses.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
43 https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/uploads/related-
documents/Independent_Review_into_Child_Sex_Abuse_Allegations_in_Football_-
_22_December_2016_vF.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2017].	
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investigation by an external entity is the preferred, and even sole, option – seen in 
2016 by the UK Sport-mandated review into the culture of British Cycling’s world-
class performance44 and the ongoing 2017 review into British Canoeing.45  
 
An investigatory report by an inquisitive Ombudsman with clear terms of reference 
and good resourcing can reveal egregious acts or omissions by those who have 
abused their positions of administrative authority to the detriment of individual 
participants and the sport’s reputation more generally. The example here is the 
investigatory report issued in 2005 by the IFO (then the Independent Football 
Commission (IFC)), which at the FA’s request reported on child protection in 
football.46  The report’s recommendations, which were impressive (and prescient) on 
improving child protection measures at both the grassroots and elite levels of 
English football, was largely left in abeyance until the more recent abuse revelations 
to hit English football - bravely related by Andy Woodward and others in November 
2016.47  
 
Why didn’t the FA act fully on the 2005 recommendations, what did it know at that 
time about the extent of child abuse and why was the funding of research by global 
expert Professor Celia Brackenridge peremptorily stopped in 2003,48 are all questions 
that remain to be answered. To be fair to the FA, they have acknowledged a 
willingness to do so and 2005 is a year that is central to the terms of reference of the 
current independent review of child sexual abuse in English football led by Clive 
Sheldon QC.49  
 
In the context of this piece, and acknowledging that child protection in sport is now 
well monitored in the UK by amongst others the NSPCC’s Child Protection in Sport 
Unit,50 the lesson to be learnt from the IFC report is that a decade of opportunity to 
further enhance child protection in the UK’s largest participatory sport may have 
been lost and principally because of the non-binding nature of the IFC’s report, 
which meant that its findings could be largely ignored by the very entity that 
commissioned it in the first place.   
 
This should not happen to any prospective UK Sports Ombudsman.  
 
At present, Sports Resolutions is the default option for the administration of such 
investigations and there is no doubt that it has significant experience in such matters 
																																								 																				
44 https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/services/CIR [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
45 https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/services/canoeinginvestigation [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
46 http://www.theifo.co.uk/reports/ChildProtectionReport.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
47 https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/nov/16/andy-woodward [Accessed 1 October 
2017]. 
48 https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/dec/29/fa-child-protection-work-celia-
brackenridge [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
49 https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/uploads/related-
documents/Terms_of_Reference_relating_to_the_Appointment_of_Clive_Sheldon_QC_on_the_Revie
w_in_to_Child_Sexual_Abuse_Allegations.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2017].  Also see: 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/dec/06/football-association-appoint-clive-sheldon-
qc-child-sex-abuse-review [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
50 https://thecpsu.org.uk [Accessed 1 October 2017].	
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based on its world-leading, child-safeguarding investigatory process.51 Nevertheless, 
giving a Sports Ombudsman such a discrete, investigatory remit, rather than leaving 
it subsumed within the range of services offered by Sports Resolutions, has its 
attractions. The principal attraction is that – and similar to the system that exists in 
the administration of doping infraction in the UK – a clear distinction remains 
between those who investigate/recommend sanction (UK Anti-Doping) and the 
entity (NADP) to whom those who seek to defend or challenge the doping infraction 
resort.  
 
Consistently, where in the future an investigation is referred to the UK Sports 
Ombudsman (by DCMS, UK Sport or an individual NGB), although the expectation 
would be that that any recommendations would be accepted on a consensual basis 
by the parties, a residual right of appeal would remain to Sports Resolutions. This 
residual right could be exercised by any party to the investigation or even by the 
Ombudsman itself where, although its investigation has revealed evidence 
indicating misconduct, the veracity of such evidence still needs, in due process, to be 
tested and cross-examined by the defending parties before any sanctions may apply.  
 
This last point is an important one.  Although a UK Sports Ombudsman could and 
should be given extensive inquisitorial powers of investigation, where an allegation 
of misconduct is made arising out of that investigation, the ‘accused’ must have the 
right to challenge its evidential basis.  
 
A good (and continuing) illustration of the problems that can arise can be found in 
one of the more famous, Ombudsman-like, investigatory reports in sport – WADA 
Independent Person or so called McLaren Reports of 18 July52 and 19 December 
2016,53 on alleged abuses of doping	 control processes during the Sochi Winter 
Olympic Games of 2014. What we have seen is that, although McLaren has said that 
there is evidence of systematic manipulation of the anti-doping system in Russia, his 
findings do not necessarily or automatically mean that individual athletes referred to 
or “implicated” in the reports are guilty of doping infractions – in his own words:  
 
“…we didn't name them for the purposes of determining that they were guilty of 
anything or had committed an anti-doping rules violation.”54 
 
The problem has been that the avenues by which individual athletes implicated in 
the report, some of whom missed out on the Rio Olympics of 2016, could challenge 
its findings were not adequately provided for – beyond an ad hoc process involving 
																																								 																				
51 https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/services/national-safeguarding-panel/investigations 
[Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
52 https://www.wada-ama.org/en/resources/doping-control-process/mclaren-independent-
investigation-report-part-i [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
53 https://www.wada-ama.org/en/resources/doping-control-process/mclaren-independent-
investigation-report-part-ii [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
54 B. Ford, “Are Russian authorities ready to cooperate in drug scandal investigation?” Espn.com, 15 
Mar 2017 [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
12 
	
an IOC committee55 and CAS, in the immediate run up and during the Rio Games.56 
At present, and noted in a statement issued following a meeting of the IOC 
President, the WADA President and Richard McLaren in May 2017, the post-
investigatory stage to the McLaren Reports has three overlapping, if not necessarily 
complementary, elements:   
 
“With regard to sanctioning the individual athletes having taken part in the Olympic 
Winter Games Sochi 2014, all Russian samples are under investigation by the 
Oswald Commission for manipulation or doping.  
 
With regard to all the other Russian athletes who may have benefited from the 
Russian system, it is the sole responsibility of the respective International Federation 
to take the appropriate action.  
 
To address the systematic manipulation of the anti-doping system in Russia as 
revealed by Prof. McLaren, the respective Disciplinary Commission chaired by the 
former President of Switzerland, Mr Samuel Schmid, is following up his findings as 
necessary.”57 
 
As the determinations of the Oswald and Schmid Commissions are awaited, the 
vacuum has been filled with critical media revelations and even more querulous 
litigation. In September 2017, for example, the New York Times reported that, 
despite the voluminous McLaren Reports, in 95 of the first 96 athletes whose cases 
were subsequently reviewed by WADA, anti-doping violations were not to be 
pursued.58 Moreover, a number of athletes implicated by the McLaren Reports have 
instigated legal proceedings premised on the associated reputational damage. In 
this, it can be argued that lack of forward planning by WADA and the IOC in 
providing an accessible means of challenging the evidence gathered in the McLaren 
Reports, may unfortunately, and to the intense frustration of many involved in anti-
doping, be undermining the broader and critical institutional revelations of the 
McLaren investigation.59   
 
This is a lesson that should be heeded if an investigatory remit is given to a UK 
Sports Ombudsman – yes, by all means give it inquisitorial powers but also provide 
																																								 																				
55 See http://www.reuters.com/article/us-doping-russia-ioc/ioc-panel-to-have-final-say-on-russian-
athletes-cleared-for-rio-idUSKCN10A0RA [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
56 See M. Ross and M. Lebbon, “A Summary of the CAS ad hoc Division’s Decisions at the Rio 
Olympic Games” Lawinsport.com, 15 September 2016, 
https://www.lawinsport.com/features/item/a-summary-of-cas-ad-hoc-division-at-the-rio-olympic-
games [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
57 Joint Statement Following the Meeting of IOC President, Prof. Richard McLaren and WADA 
President, (IOC, 2 May 2017), https://www.olympic.org/news/joint-statement-following-the-
meeting-of-ioc-president-prof-richard-mclaren-and-wada-president [Accessed 1 October 2017].  
58 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/sports/olympics/russian-doping-wada.html [Accessed 1 
October 2017]. 
59 See, for example, the Press Release by the Institute of National Anti-Doping Agencies, ‘iNADO 
Board Urges a Principled Approach to Russian Sanctions’, 22 August 2017, 
http://www.inado.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Press_Releases/2017_August_iNADO_Statement_o
n_IOC_and_Russia__2017August22_.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
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reasonably that the results of such investigations can be held to account 
adversarially by an implicated party. In the short term, this level of accountability 
may be a burden on an emerging UK Sports Ombudsman but, in the longer term, 
this level of transparency would serve only to underpin its authority and credibility.  
 
Preventative and Accessible  
 
There are three final points to be made relating to any suggested UK Sports 
Ombudsman.  
 
First, the above models have been presented in a somewhat reactionary manner i.e., 
it is only on foot of a complaint that the Ombudsman becomes engaged. A Sports 
Ombudsman’s office ought however to have a broader, preventative remit. Over 
time its reports, recommendations and adjudications would provide for consistency 
of practice in dispute resolution among all agencies and governing bodies operating 
across UK sport, simultaneously ensuring that such entities provide a better service 
to their athletes, participants and the wider public. In short, while a UK Sports 
Ombudsman on the USOC model might provide advice to and advocate for athletes; 
simultaneously a Sports Ombudsman could be of assistance to NGBs in helping 
them develop policies and procedures that are equitable and fit for purpose and thus 
over time abrogating the need for athletes to revert to the Ombudsman. 
 
Of especial interest here is the need for UK sport’s bodies (as it is internationally) to 
develop a consistent, creditable approach to whistle-blowing60 – how to encourage 
more in sport to make properly protected disclosures; how such intelligence may be 
properly assessed; and the proper treatment of whistle-blowers in the aftermath of 
their revelations.  The experience of whistle blowers in sport is a sorry one and a UK 
Sports Ombudsman could take the lead in developing a coherent, affirming 
approach. 
 
Second, and again related to the Sports Ombudsman’s preventative remit is that an 
Ombudsman’s office might provide some counter balance to what might be called 
the “juridification” of sports disputes. This is the reference to the process (and it 
relates to the increased commercialisation of sport in recent decades) whereby the 
framing of sports disputes both in how they are regulated and resolved is 
increasingly formalised, legalised and adversarial in nature.   
 
A prime example of the consequences of juridification can be seen in the perspective 
of some athletes towards doping: colloquially, if WADA hasn’t banned it, I can use 
it; or more technically, if a substance is not on the current WADA Prohibited List of 
Substances and Methods, then it can be used without sanction irrespective of that 
																																								 																				
60 C. Davies and J. Mitchell, “Is Whistleblowing in Sport Fit for Purpose? Part 1 – The Current Picture” 
Lawinsport.com, 16 September 2016, https://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/is-whistleblowing-
in-sport-fit-for-purpose-part-1-the-current-picture [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
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substance or method’s experimental nature or its performance enhancing or health 
consequences.61   
 
Similarly, when the extant rules of a sport are challenged by the personal 
circumstances of an athlete - the examples of Kristen Worsley,62 Dutee Chand63 and 
Caster Semenya64 are prime illustrations – the reaction of sports governing bodies is 
often to hide behind formalistic, and often hurtful, legalese relating to that athlete’s 
“eligibility” to compete.  
 
In both of the above scenarios – doping and eligibility – the wider ethical, consensus-
building interpretation of the matter in dispute appears secondary to a narrow, 
adversarial legal construction. In this, it would be welcome if a UK Sports 
Ombudsman could encompass, along Canadian lines, a Centre for Ethics in Sport,65 
and which could lead the debate on ethical approaches to issues in sport and 
including issues such as concussion in contact sports especially among children, 
parental behaviour at sporting events, mental health issues in elite sport, access and 
social inclusion in sports etc.66 
 
Finally, a key underlying aspect of a UK Sports Ombudsman must be that of 
accessibility. Paraphrasing the recent UK Supreme Court Unison case holding that 
fees in respect of proceedings at employment tribunals were unlawful because of 
their effects on access to justice, there is, as in the employer-employee relationship, 
an  “imbalance” of power between NGBs and individuals such that in order for the 
rights conferred on athletes by a sport’s regulation to be effectively upheld, they 
must be accompanied by dispute resolution mechanisms that are easily accessible at 
the point of entry.67 The UK Sports Ombudsman must be similarly accessible. 
Although and again quoting directly from Unison, breaches of employment (and by 
analogy sporting) rights “…should be resolved by negotiation or mediation, those 
procedures can only work fairly and properly if they are backed up by the 
knowledge on both sides that a fair and just system of adjudication will be available 
																																								 																				
61 See J. Anderson, “The Juridification and Criminalisation of Doping: Time to Revive the Spirit of 
Sport?” in D Healey and U Haas (eds) Doping in Sport: An In-Depth Analysis of Impact, Oxford, Hart-
Bloomsbury, 2016, 251-267. 
62 See https://www.lawinsport.com/sports-law-news/item/cycling-canada-ontario-cycling-
association-the-union-cycliste-internationale-uci-and-canadian-athlete-kristen-worley-settle-human-
rights-application-to-promote-inclusive-sporting-environments [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
63 See https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/sports/olympics/gender-dutee-chand-india.html 
[Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
64 See https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/jul/03/caster-semenya-could-be-forced-to-
undertake-hormone-therapy-for-future-olympics [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
65 http://cces.ca [Accessed 1 October 2017]. 
66 See variously M. Beloff, “Sport, Ethics and the Law” (2017)(1) International Sports Law Review 3-10; F. 
Lopez Frias and M. McNamee, “Ethics, Brain Injuries, and Sports: Prohibition, Reform, and 
Prudence” (2017) 11(3) Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 264-280 and M. Mountjoy et al, “Safeguarding the 
Child Athlete in Sport: a Review, a Framework and Recommendations for the IOC Youth Athlete 
Development Model” (2015) 49 (13) Br J Sports Med 883–886. 
67 R (on the application of UNISON) (Appellant) v Lord Chancellor (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 51 at para. 6.  
Available at: https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2015-0233-judgment.pdf [Accessed 1 
October 2017]. 
15 
	
if they fail.	 Otherwise, the party in the stronger bargaining position will always 
prevail.”68  
 
A UK Sports Ombudsman, accessible at the point of entry, can similarly and fairly 
hold sport’s decision makers to account in a manner that benefits all those who 
participate in UK sport.  
 
Conclusion 
 
NGBs’ duty of care as outlined in the DoC in Sport Report is not the only duty that 
exists in sport. All of us who participate in our various sports across the UK have 
also delegated a duty towards NGBs to ensure that our sport is administered in such 
a way that it can grow and continue to be enjoyed by future generations. That 
delegated, implied duty has been given in trust and confidence by us to NGBs. In 
recent times, some NGBs have breached that duty and undermined our public trust 
and confidence in our sport. Some NGBs have, distracted by a “win at all costs 
mentality” of medals and targets, forgotten their (athlete) responsibilities and their 
(grass) roots. The DoC in Sport Report, if implemented, will have an immediate and 
positive effect on UK sport; thereafter an independent Sports Ombudsman could, for 
a fraction of the price of hosting a mega event such as the Olympics, ensure that the 
DoC in Sport Report’s legacy is a truly enduring one for sports participation in the 
UK.  
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